2025
|
| 18. | Deans-Browne, Calvin Christopher James Lee; Roth, Pia; Echterbeck, Carolin; Singmann, Henrik: Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation. In: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2025. @inproceedings{deans-browneDifferentialMemoryBeliefCongruent2025b,
title = {Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation},
author = {Calvin Christopher James Lee Deans-Browne and Pia Roth and Carolin Echterbeck and Henrik Singmann},
url = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5nn3w7xz, CogSci Proceedings link},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-07-27},
urldate = {2025-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},
volume = {47},
abstract = {People often rely more on their prior beliefs than the presented evidence when evaluating arguments. We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. We hypothesise that when individuals encounter an argument that is congruent with their beliefs, it activates related information in memory. For belief-congruent arguments, people should therefore be more likely to both correctly recognise previously encountered information and incorrectly recognise new information as previously seen. To test this, we first investigated the effect of participants' beliefs about political claims on their evaluation of corresponding arguments that varied in quality. We then employed a surprise memory test to assess participants' recognition memory for these arguments. While we replicated the finding that prior beliefs drive argument evaluations, prior beliefs did not affect memory performance for all arguments in the same way. Our results indicate that individuals may use prior beliefs to aid memory only when the memory task is difficult.},
keywords = {Belief bias, Belief-based reasoning, Everyday reasoning, Informal reasoning, real-world reasoning, Reasoning, Recognition memory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
People often rely more on their prior beliefs than the presented evidence when evaluating arguments. We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. We hypothesise that when individuals encounter an argument that is congruent with their beliefs, it activates related information in memory. For belief-congruent arguments, people should therefore be more likely to both correctly recognise previously encountered information and incorrectly recognise new information as previously seen. To test this, we first investigated the effect of participants' beliefs about political claims on their evaluation of corresponding arguments that varied in quality. We then employed a surprise memory test to assess participants' recognition memory for these arguments. While we replicated the finding that prior beliefs drive argument evaluations, prior beliefs did not affect memory performance for all arguments in the same way. Our results indicate that individuals may use prior beliefs to aid memory only when the memory task is difficult. |
| 17. | Gong, Tianwei; Hou, Yining; Singmann, Henrik; Bramley, Neil R.: Identifying "when" and "whether" causation: How people distinguish generation, hastening, prevention, and delay . In: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2025. @inproceedings{gongIdentifyingWhenWhether2025b,
title = {Identifying "when" and "whether" causation: How people distinguish generation, hastening, prevention, and delay },
author = {Tianwei Gong and Yining Hou and Henrik Singmann and Neil R. Bramley},
url = {https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8kj385bv, CogSci Proceedings link},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-07-27},
urldate = {2025-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society},
volume = {47},
abstract = {Causal relationships in the real world can have diverse mechanisms with differing statistical signatures. We investigate whether people can distinguish between causes that merely change the timing of events ("when" causes) and those that bring about or prevent those events ("whether" causes). We designed experiments where the rate of an event varies over time due to one such causal influence. Events were shown in real time in Experiment 1 and as a timeline visualization in Experiment 2. Our results suggest that people are capable of identifying "when" and "whether" causes but with a distinctive pattern of confusability: People confuse Generation with Hastening; and Prevention with Delaying. We develop a Causal Abstraction from Summarizing Events (CASE) model, which explains people's judgments as mediated by their rate-change-event detection. We discuss how this line of research can be extended to study human cognition about dynamic causal influences and its relevance to real-life judgment and decision-making.},
keywords = {causal reasoning, causality, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Causal relationships in the real world can have diverse mechanisms with differing statistical signatures. We investigate whether people can distinguish between causes that merely change the timing of events ("when" causes) and those that bring about or prevent those events ("whether" causes). We designed experiments where the rate of an event varies over time due to one such causal influence. Events were shown in real time in Experiment 1 and as a timeline visualization in Experiment 2. Our results suggest that people are capable of identifying "when" and "whether" causes but with a distinctive pattern of confusability: People confuse Generation with Hastening; and Prevention with Delaying. We develop a Causal Abstraction from Summarizing Events (CASE) model, which explains people's judgments as mediated by their rate-change-event detection. We discuss how this line of research can be extended to study human cognition about dynamic causal influences and its relevance to real-life judgment and decision-making. |
2024
|
| 16. | Deans-Browne, Calvin; Băitanu, Alexandra; Dubinska, Yuliya; Singmann, Henrik: Inconsistent Arguments Are Perceived as Better Than Appeals to Authority: An Extension of the Everyday Belief Bias. In: Samuelson, Larissa K; Frank, Stefan; Toneva, Mariya; Mackey, Allyson P.; Hazeltine, Eliot (Ed.): Proceedings of the 46th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2024. @inproceedings{deans-browneInconsistentArgumentsAre2024,
title = {Inconsistent Arguments Are Perceived as Better Than Appeals to Authority: An Extension of the Everyday Belief Bias},
author = {Calvin Deans-Browne and Alexandra Băitanu and Yuliya Dubinska and Henrik Singmann},
editor = {Larissa K Samuelson and Stefan Frank and Mariya Toneva and Allyson P. Mackey and Eliot Hazeltine},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Deans-Browne%20et%20al.%20-%202024%20-%20Inconsistent%20Arguments%20are%20Perceived%20as%20Better%20Tha.pdf, final PDF
https://osf.io/j2xn3, OSF link},
doi = {10.31234/osf.io/j2xn3},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-24},
urldate = {2025-01-15},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 46th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},
abstract = {Social media is often used as a platform where individuals engage in debate regarding topics that are important to them. Not all arguments are equally convincing, and whilst a given argument may be persuasive to some people, it is often seen as inadequate by others. We are interested in both the individual and argument level differences that make ‘everyday’ arguments such as those on social media persuasive. In a replication of our Everyday Belief Bias Task (Deans-Browne & Singmann, 2024), we investigate this question using a paradigm that consists of two parts. In the first part, we measure participant’s individual beliefs about eight claims each referring to a political topic (e.g., Abortion should be legal). In the second part, participants rated an argument for each of these claims that was deemed as either good, inconsistent (containing internal inconsistencies), or authority-based (being centered around appeals to authority). We replicated the belief consistency effect – participants preferred arguments that were also in line with their beliefs. We also found that authority-based arguments were rated as worse than inconsistent arguments, and that both types of arguments were rated as worse than good arguments. The implications are first that people do not evaluate arguments independently of the background beliefs held about them. Secondly, people are willing to ignore inconsistencies in arguments more than they are willing to accept the endorsement of authority figures as adequate evidence for arguments.},
keywords = {Belief bias, real-world reasoning, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Social media is often used as a platform where individuals engage in debate regarding topics that are important to them. Not all arguments are equally convincing, and whilst a given argument may be persuasive to some people, it is often seen as inadequate by others. We are interested in both the individual and argument level differences that make ‘everyday’ arguments such as those on social media persuasive. In a replication of our Everyday Belief Bias Task (Deans-Browne & Singmann, 2024), we investigate this question using a paradigm that consists of two parts. In the first part, we measure participant’s individual beliefs about eight claims each referring to a political topic (e.g., Abortion should be legal). In the second part, participants rated an argument for each of these claims that was deemed as either good, inconsistent (containing internal inconsistencies), or authority-based (being centered around appeals to authority). We replicated the belief consistency effect – participants preferred arguments that were also in line with their beliefs. We also found that authority-based arguments were rated as worse than inconsistent arguments, and that both types of arguments were rated as worse than good arguments. The implications are first that people do not evaluate arguments independently of the background beliefs held about them. Secondly, people are willing to ignore inconsistencies in arguments more than they are willing to accept the endorsement of authority figures as adequate evidence for arguments. |
2023
|
| 15. | Meyer-Grant, Constantin G.; Cruz, Nicole; Singmann, Henrik; Winiger, Samuel; Goswani, Spriha; Hayes, Brett K.; Klauer, Karl Christoph: Are Logical Intuitions Only Make-Believe? Reexamining the Logic-Liking Effect. In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 49, iss. 8, pp. 1280-1305, 2023. @article{Meyer-Grant2023b,
title = {Are Logical Intuitions Only Make-Believe? Reexamining the Logic-Liking Effect},
author = {Constantin G. Meyer-Grant and Nicole Cruz and Henrik Singmann and Samuel Winiger and Spriha Goswani and Brett K. Hayes and Karl Christoph Klauer},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Meyer-Grant%20et%20al.%20-%202022%20-%20Are%20logical%20intuitions%20only%20make-believe%20Reexamin.pdf, journal PDF
http://singmann.org/download/publications/Are_logical_intuitions_only_make-believe_clean.pdf, accepted manuscript
},
doi = {10.1037/xlm0001152},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-08-01},
urldate = {2024-02-01},
journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},
volume = {49},
issue = {8},
pages = {1280-1305},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, Intuition, Reasoning, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2021
|
| 14. | Kominsky, Jonathan; Gerstenberg, Tobias; Pelz, Madeline; Sheskin, Mark; Singmann, Henrik; Schulz, Laura; Keil, Frank C.: The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development. In: Developmental Psychology, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 253-268, 2021. @article{Kominsky2021,
title = {The trajectory of counterfactual simulation in development},
author = {Jonathan Kominsky and Tobias Gerstenberg and Madeline Pelz and Mark Sheskin and Henrik Singmann and Laura Schulz and Frank C. Keil},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Kominsky-et-al.-2021-The-trajectory-of-counterfactual-simulation-in-dev.pdf, published version
http://singmann.org/download/publications/Kominsky_in-press_Tracing_counterfactual_development.pdf, accepted version
https://osf.io/5jw6y/, data, code, and materials (OSF)},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-04},
journal = {Developmental Psychology},
volume = {57},
number = {2},
pages = {253-268},
keywords = {causality, measurement models, MPT models, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
| 13. | Stewart, Andrew J.; Singmann, Henrik; Haigh, Matthew; Wood, Jeffrey S.; Douven, Igor: Tracking the eye of the beholder: is explanation subjective?. In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 199-206, 2021. @article{Stewart2022,
title = {Tracking the eye of the beholder: is explanation subjective?},
author = {Andrew J. Stewart and Henrik Singmann and Matthew Haigh and Jeffrey S. Wood and Igor Douven },
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Stewart-et-al.-2021-Tracking-the-eye-of-the-beholder-is-explanation-s.pdf, Journal PDF},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-04-01},
journal = {Journal of Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {33},
number = {2},
pages = {199-206},
keywords = {explanations, mixed models, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2020
|
| 12. | Douven, Igor; Elqayam, Shira; Singmann, Henrik; van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Janneke: Conditionals and Inferential Connections: Toward a New Semantics. In: Thinking & Reasoning, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 311-351, 2020. @article{Douven2021,
title = {Conditionals and Inferential Connections: Toward a New Semantics},
author = {Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam and Henrik Singmann and Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Douven-et-al.-2020-Conditionals-and-inferential-connections-toward-a.pdf, Journal PDF
http://singmann.org/download/publications/Douven_et_al_Conditionals_and_Inferential_Connections_TR.pdf, Accepted Manuscript},
doi = {10.1080/13546783.2019.1619623},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-07-02},
journal = {Thinking & Reasoning},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
pages = {311-351},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2018
|
| 11. | Trippas, Dries; Kellen, David; Singmann, Henrik; Pennycook, Gordon; Koehler, Derek J.; Fugelsang, Jonathan A.; Dubé, Chad: Characterizing Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning: A Hierarchical-Bayesian Meta-Analysis of ROC Data. In: Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 2141–2174, 2018. @article{Trippas2018,
title = {Characterizing Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning: A Hierarchical-Bayesian Meta-Analysis of ROC Data},
author = {Dries Trippas and David Kellen and Henrik Singmann and Gordon Pennycook and Derek J. Koehler and Jonathan A. Fugelsang and Chad Dubé},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Trippas-et-al.-2018-Characterizing-belief-bias-in-syllogistic-reasonin.pdf, published version
http://singmann.org/download/publications/trippas_kellen_singmann_et_al_submitted_online.pdf, accepted manuscript
https://osf.io/8dfyv/, data and modeling code},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-12-01},
journal = {Psychonomic Bulletin & Review},
volume = {25},
number = {6},
pages = {2141–2174},
keywords = {hierarchical-Bayesian modeling, mathematical modeling, measurement models, Meta Analysis, Reasoning, Signal detection, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
| 10. | Winiger, Samuel; Singmann, Henrik; Kellen, David: Measuring Belief Bias with Ternary Response Sets. In: Rogers, Tim; Rau, Marina; Zhu, Jerry; Kalish, Chuck (Ed.): Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 1171–1176, Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society, 2018. @inproceedings{winiger_measuring_2018,
title = {Measuring Belief Bias with Ternary Response Sets},
author = {Samuel Winiger and Henrik Singmann and David Kellen},
editor = {Tim Rogers and Marina Rau and Jerry Zhu and Chuck Kalish},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Winiger-et-al.-2018-Measuring-Belief-Bias-with-Ternary-Response-Sets.pdf, published version},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-07-26},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},
pages = {1171--1176},
publisher = {Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society},
keywords = {Belief bias, measurement models, MPT models, Reasoning, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
|
| 9. | Markovits, Henry; Brisson, Janie; de Chantal, Pier-Luc; Singmann, Henrik: Multiple Layers of Information Processing in Deductive Reasoning: Combining Dual Strategy and Dual-Source Approaches to Reasoning. In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 394-405, 2018. @article{Markovits2018,
title = {Multiple Layers of Information Processing in Deductive Reasoning: Combining Dual Strategy and Dual-Source Approaches to Reasoning},
author = {Henry Markovits and Janie Brisson and Pier-Luc de Chantal and Henrik Singmann},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Markovits-et-al.-2018-Multiple-layers-of-information-processing-in-deduc.pdf, published manuscript},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-06-30},
journal = {Journal of Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {394-405},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, Probabilistic reasoning, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
| 8. | Douven, Igor; Elqayam, Shira; Singmann, Henrik; van Wijnbergen-Huitink, Janneke: Conditionals and Inferential Connections: A Hypothetical Inferential Theory. In: Cognitive Psychology, vol. 101, pp. 50-81, 2018. @article{Douven2017,
title = {Conditionals and Inferential Connections: A Hypothetical Inferential Theory},
author = {Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam and Henrik Singmann and Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Douven_Elqayam_Singmann_Wijnbergen-Huitink-HIT_in_press.pdf, accepted manuscript
https://osf.io/3uajq/, OSF link (includes all data and code)},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-01},
journal = {Cognitive Psychology},
volume = {101},
pages = {50-81},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2016
|
| 7. | Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels; Singmann, Henrik; Klauer, Karl Christoph: The Relevance Effect and Conditionals. In: Cognition, vol. 150, pp. 26-36, 2016. @article{Olsen3999,
title = {The Relevance Effect and Conditionals},
author = {Niels Skovgaard-Olsen and Henrik Singmann and Karl Christoph Klauer},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Skovgaard-Olsen-et-al.-2016-The-relevance-effect-and-conditionals.pdf, published paper
http://singmann.org/download/publications/supplemental/The-Relevance-Effect-and-Conditionals_supplemental.pdf, supplemental materials
https://osf.io/j4swp/, data and analysis scripts (OSF)},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-01},
journal = {Cognition},
volume = {150},
pages = {26-36},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, mixed models, new paradigm psychology of reasoning, Probabilistic reasoning, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2014
|
| 6. | Ragni, Marco; Singmann, Henrik; Steinlein, Eva-Maria: Theory Comparison for Generalized Quantifiers. In: Bello, Paul; Guarini, Marcello; McShane, Marjorie; Scassellati, Brian (Ed.): Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 1330–1335, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 2014. @inproceedings{ragni_theory_2014,
title = {Theory Comparison for Generalized Quantifiers},
author = {Ragni, Marco and Singmann, Henrik and Steinlein, Eva-Maria},
editor = {Bello, Paul and Guarini, Marcello and McShane, Marjorie and Scassellati, Brian},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/2014_ragni_cogsci.pdf, published article},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},
pages = {1330--1335},
publisher = {Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society},
keywords = {logical thinking, mathematical modeling, measurement models, MPT models, Reasoning, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
|
| 5. | Singmann, Henrik; Kellen, David: Concerns with the SDT approach to causal conditional reasoning: a comment on Trippas, Handley, Verde, Roser, McNair, and Evans (2014). In: Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 5, pp. 402, 2014. @article{singmann_concerns_2014,
title = {Concerns with the SDT approach to causal conditional reasoning: a comment on Trippas, Handley, Verde, Roser, McNair, and Evans (2014)},
author = {Singmann, Henrik and Kellen, David},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Singmann%20und%20Kellen%20-%202014%20-%20Concerns%20with%20the%20SDT%20approach%20to%20causal%20condition.pdf, published article},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
volume = {5},
pages = {402},
keywords = {Belief bias, Conditional reasoning, mathematical modeling, measurement models, model identifiability, Reasoning, Signal detection, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
| 4. | Singmann, Henrik; Klauer, Karl Christoph; Kellen, David: Intuitive Logic Revisited: New Data and a Bayesian Mixed Model Meta-Analysis. In: PLoS ONE, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. e94223, 2014. @article{singmann_intuitive_2014,
title = {Intuitive Logic Revisited: New Data and a Bayesian Mixed Model Meta-Analysis},
author = {Singmann, Henrik and Klauer, Karl Christoph and Kellen, David},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/singmann-klauer-kellen_2014.pdf, published article
http://singmann.org/download/publications/data-scripts/2014_singmann_kellen_klauer.zip, raw data and supplemental materials},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
journal = {PLoS ONE},
volume = {9},
number = {4},
pages = {e94223},
keywords = {Dual Process Models, Fluency, Intuition, Meta Analysis, Reasoning, replication, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
| 3. | Singmann, Henrik; Klauer, Karl Christoph; Over, David E.: New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model. In: Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 5, pp. 316, 2014, (winner of best student paper award of DFG priority programm "New frameworks of rationality"). @article{singmann_new_2014,
title = {New normative standards of conditional reasoning and the dual-source model},
author = {Henrik Singmann and Karl Christoph Klauer and David E. Over },
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Singmann-Klauer-Over_2014.pdf, published article
http://singmann.org/download/publications/data-scripts/2014_singmann_klauer_over.zip, data and analysis scripts},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-01-01},
journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
volume = {5},
pages = {316},
note = {winner of best student paper award of DFG priority programm "New frameworks of rationality"},
keywords = {coherence, Conditional reasoning, dual-source model, mathematical modeling, measurement models, mixed models, new paradigm psychology of reasoning, p-validity, Probabilistic reasoning, rationality, Reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2013
|
| 2. | Klauer, Karl Christoph; Singmann, Henrik: Does logic feel good? Testing for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1265–1273, 2013, ISSN: 0278-7393. @article{klauer_does_2013,
title = {Does logic feel good? Testing for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning},
author = {Klauer, Karl Christoph and Singmann, Henrik},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Klauer%20und%20Singmann%20-%202013%20-%20Does%20logic%20feel%20good%20Testing%20for%20intuitive%20detect.pdf, published article
http://singmann.org/download/publications/data-scripts/2013_klauer_singmann.zip, data and analysis scripts},
issn = {0278-7393},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},
volume = {39},
number = {4},
pages = {1265--1273},
keywords = {Dual Process Models, Fluency, Intuition, Reasoning, replication, syllogistic reasoning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|
2011
|
| 1. | Singmann, Henrik; Klauer, Karl Christoph: Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning. In: Thinking & Reasoning, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 247–281, 2011, ISSN: 1354-6783. @article{singmann_deductive_2011,
title = {Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning},
author = {Singmann, Henrik and Klauer, Karl Christoph},
url = {http://singmann.org/download/publications/Singmann%20&%20Klauer%20(2011).pdf, published article
http://singmann.org/download/publications/data-scripts/2011_singmann_klauer.zip, data and analysis script},
issn = {1354-6783},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
journal = {Thinking & Reasoning},
volume = {17},
number = {3},
pages = {247--281},
keywords = {Conditional reasoning, Deductive reasoning, Dual Process Models, new paradigm psychology of reasoning, Probabilistic reasoning, Reasoning, state-trace analysis},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
|